Neo Security
01.11.2025 22:22
The 4TB time bomb: when EY's cloud went public (and what it taught us)
Let's deep dive into cloud misconfigurations, attack surface management, and why responsible disclosure matters
29.10.2025
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7 min read
Cloud security
Responsible disclosure
Attack Surface Management
Here at Neo Security, we don't just "scan." We practice a form of digital cartography.
The modern internet isn't a fixed map; it's a constantly shifting, fluid landscape of assets, relationships, and data.
Together with our partners, we map it, understand it, and find the parts that organizations have forgotten they own.
During one of these recent mapping expeditions, our lead researcher found something that made him stop and double-check his work.
Our engineers have real incident response experience. Worked on breaches where attackers found their way in through database files that were briefly exposed. We know the scenario well: a .BAK file leaked for five minutes. An exposure window measured in seconds. That's all it takes.
We know what the theoretical looks like when it becomes real.
The moment
One of our hackers wasn't running a broad, noisy scan. No. Instead, he was doing focused, low-level tooling work: tweaking passive data sources, stepping through raw network traffic. Hours in, staring at output buffers, something caught his attention.
A 200 OK... on a HEAD request.
For context:
a HEAD request is like knocking on a door and asking, "Who's in there, and how big is the room?" You're asking a server for metadata about a file (its size, type, last-modified date) without actually downloading it. It's supposed to be a fast, harmless query.
The server's answer was anything but harmless.
Content-Length: 4... terabytes?
He sat back.
Four terabytes. That's not a file. That's a data center. That's the entire collection of the British Library. That's massive.
He stared at the screen. The file names looked exactly like SQL Server backup files. His mind went to the obvious: if this is what he thinks it is, it's bad.
What is a SQL Server BAK file. Why did he take this seriously?
An SQL Server BAK file is a complete database backup. It contains everything: the schema, all the data, stored procedures, and critically, every secret stored in those tables.
API keys, session tokens, user credentials, cached authentication tokens, service account passwords. Whatever the application stored in the database.
Not just one secret... all the secrets.
Finding a 4TB SQL backup exposed to the public internet is like finding the master blueprint and the physical keys to a vault, just sitting there. With a note that says "free to a good home."
He'd investigated breaches that started with less. Way less. He once traced an entire ransomware incident back to a single web.config file that leaked a connection string. That was 8 kilobytes.
This was four terabytes.
The investigation process
He Googled the bucket and file specifics. A few unrelated results came up, but nothing clicked immediately. No obvious website. Someone was paying for that Azure subscription though. This was live.
Trying to confirm ownership can be hard. He started digging. Company name searches led to business merger documents. In a south-central European language. He fed them through DeepL. The translation revealed the company was acquired in 2020 by a larger entity, but the parent company name wasn't immediately obvious.
Then he ran an SOA record lookup. A "Start of Authority" DNS query, basically asking the internet's phonebook "who's really in charge of this domain?" The response came back pointing to an authoritative DNS server: ey.com.
That's when everything clicked.
His stomach sank.
This wasn't some startup. This was Ernst & Young.
One of the Big Four accounting firms. Global. Massive.
The kind of organization that audits major corporations, handles M&A due diligence for multi-billion euro deals, and has access to financial records that could move markets.
But he still had to be sure before reaching out.
He couldn't download 4 terabytes, that's not research, that's a felony. So he did what an engineer would do: he downloaded the first thousand bytes.
The bottle was half full
Most file types have a "signature" in the start of the file, the very first few bytes. It's a digital fingerprint.
A PDF starts with %PDF-.
A ZIP with PK....
A JPEG with FF D8 FF.
An ELF binary with 7F 45 4C 46.
These "magic bytes" are how the file command on Unix systems works. It doesn't look at the file extension (which anyone can fake). It looks at the actual bytes.
He parsed the magic bytes. sql-server backup. Confirmed. This wasn't encrypted. The file format was unmistakably a database backup.
And that meant this was as bad as he thought.
He sat back and exhaled. He'd been here before, not personally discovering something this big, but cleaning up after someone else had 🤮